Debating the debate: responding to my fisking

The 3 leaders’ debates have been and gone. Stef gave me a good fisking after the first debate, based on a post I wrote a few weeks ago. Now taking the long view, I thought I’d respond to each of his points.

Note: my original points in italics; Stef’s argument in italics below.

1. Debating points and issues in the debates won’t really be the aim. Instead, it will be used as an opportunity to trade blows, irrespective of the content of those blows
Stef: Some real issues were aired and some interesting debates did occur, albeit they were somewhat stymied by the short amount of time available for each question.

After the first debate, it did seem that some interesting debates might occur. But they didn’t. I was wrong in the sense that the debates would be used to trade blows. Instead, they were used to just say and then repeat their key messages. This wasn’t really 3 debates; it was one debate repeated 3 times. (And the format of the debate, as Stef rightly says, stymied the debate.)

2. What goes on in the debates is almost neither here nor there; it’s how they get spun afterwards that matters.
Stef: Whether the debates were of Aristotlian profoundness or playground pettiness, how they get spun afterwards was always going to be as important, if not more important than the debate itself. This does not invalidate the debates themselves, what went on in the debate did make a difference to how the debate was spun.

My original point safely holds. There were clearly prepared lines and put-downs which were echoed in the post-match spin. Related to point 1 above, the debates weren’t genuine debates; they were just an opportunity to establish and repeat key messages, not debate the merits or otherwise of each other’s policies.

3. I’m not one of those that complains about the American-isation of politics, and in particular the cult of personality in politics. The leadership debates will do nothing to assuage people who do complain about this.
Stef: Agreed.

We were agreed on this, so I don’t need to re-emphasize I was right in the first place.

4. Does anyone remember the one-to-one interviews between Jeremy Paxman and each party leader during the 2005 general election? If you do, you’ll remember they were not known for their jibber and jabber on policy issues but instead adversarial tosh focused disproportionately on specific issues (e.g. the number of illegal immigrants in Britain).
Stef: [T]here was a disproportionate amount of focus on the issue of immigration. Yet because of the uniquely non-adversarial format of the debates, we got into more detail and more clarity on policy positions than any PMQs or Question Time.

We did get into a bit more detail about a very few things; but focusing disproporionately on specific issues – particularly immigration, interestingly enough – did happen. The debates were narrow in their focus.

5. The worry about ‘losing’ the debate, or being the subject of a terrific putdown is precisely what leads to the score-draw results assigned to most presidential debates of the last 12 years. Even though this is the first time debates have been held here, the tendency will be for the candidates to play it safe.
Stef: Yes, it was a play-it-safe debate for all the candidates but especially the ‘incumbents’ but Clegg did better because he played it less safe. Here’s betting that the next two will be a bit livelier. A real good put-down may win it.

The perspective of the 3 debates shows that the debates were primarily safe. For all the media tried to find one, there wasn’t a significant moment in any of the debates.

6. Most people think these debates will be good for Gordon Brown. I don’t agree because (1) the Tories are good at precisely this sort of thing, being the presentation of policy rather than what the policy is; and (2) it depends which Gordon Brown turns up. I suspect it will be the one that has turned up at Prime Minister’s Questions for the last 2 years, which is no good thing.
Stef: Patently wrong on both accounts. Cameron inexplicably failed to present himself and his policies at all well, usually his forte. Brown, clearly dreading the event, actually did much better than he thought he would. Although in my opinion he came ‘last’ it was not by much and he, along with Cameron, can only improve over the next two debates.

I was certainly wrong on (1): Cameron did an awful job in the first debate, did marginally better in the second and was his best in the third. Brown was consistently stodgy. The polls for each of the debates bare this out – only in rogue polls did Brown not come third.

7. The spare wheel: there will have to be air time for Nick Clegg as leader as the Lib Dems. This will just be embarrassing for everyone concerned.
Stef: Erm, I’ll let Rich defend himself on this one. Yes the Lib Dems won’t be the largest single party but hell, the kaleidoscope has been well and truly shaken.

I wouldn’t try to defend it: Clegg clearly did well. I’m going to write a post on my wider thoughts on the Lib Dems over the last two or three weeks.

8. Which television stations will cover this? If not everyone can cover every debate, what will the implication be?
Stef: 9 million viewers for a 90 minute political programme on ITV without adverts is absolutely astonishing. The Sky debate will have next to bugger all viewers, mores the shame. What I’d give for a Channel 4 debate with the mighty Jon Snow.

The ITV debate had 9.4m viewers – around 37% share of the viewing audience that night if I remember correctly. Sky had just over 4m and I still don’t know the figure for the BBC debate (which I expect will be the highest viewing audience). This partly anticipates my riposte to point 9 below, but I don’t think the turnout will be higher than the 1997 election (i.e. 71.4%). Viewing figures aren’t much of a proxy for this, but I think the media is more excited by them than the voting public.

9. Does anyone seriously think the debates will engage a wider audience than those engaged in politics anyway? I doubt it very much.
Stef: Policy by anecdote warning! This weekend I had my first ever party political conversation with my brother whom is not atypical of the disengaged voter but a good proxy. He did not watch the debates but read about them afterwards and looked at some of it on YouTube. His verdict. Cameron “Don’t trust him” (Incidentally my mother thought he looked like a porn actor) Brown “Doesn’t know what he’s doing” Clegg “Seemed straightforward and normal”. Policy by anecdote completed. This is why anecdotes are, in the right context, very powerful. My brother and many like him will possibly vote for the first time ever because of the debate and many may well vote Lib Dem, fundamentally changing the political landscape in this country. This would not have happened without the debate.

I’ll leave the point about whether or not the landscape has been changed by the Lib Dems to a later post (here’s a quick preview: I don’t think it has). But I stand by my original point: the leaders’ debates have not engaged a wider audience than those engaged in politics anyway. Ultimately, this will be borne out by the turnout of the election. But beyond the bubble that the media has created, and which has been supported by social media (especially Twitter), I suspect a significant proportion of the public will remain disengaged by this general election.

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My #ge2010 majority prediction

I thought it would be useful to revisit my prediction for the General Election outcome, made here:

[M]y prediction is scenario 6b: that the Conservatives will be the largest party with a majority of between 20-40 and Labour dumping Gordon Brown. A David Cameron victory will mainly be fueled by a relatively low turnout because of voters further disenfranchised by the expenses scandals – a low turnout favours the Tories.

I’m not saying that’s the outcome I want; I’m saying it’s the outcome I think we’re going to get.

Which is all a long way round of saying that the betting markets threw up some interesting movements today, which seem to play out my prediction.

I may just go and put a few quid on it.

General Election 2010 scenario planning

Gordon Brown today insisted he will stay on as Labour party leader until he has a majority. The polls suggest a hung parliament is a distinct possibility. Ladies and gentlemen: I suggest you book 7 May off work and watch the general election of 2010 turn into a live demonstration of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle as applied to politics: as soon as you think you’ve spotted a definitive gain or loss, the less certain the overall result will be.

From a Labour party perspective, the likely permutations of what might happen just to the position of Prime Minister are mind-boggling. I think they’re as follows:

1a. Gordon Brown secures an overall parliamentary majority and remains as Labour party leader and Prime Minister.

1b. Gordon Brown secures an overall parliamentary majority but is replaced as Labour party leader and Prime Minister.

2a. Gordon Brown doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority but remains Labour party leader and Prime Minister and forms a single-party minority government (with occasional outside support).

2a(i). In 2a, Brown loses a vote in the House of Commons and resigns as Prime Minister but remains as leader of the Labour party. The leader of the next-biggest party (i.e. David Cameron) is then asked to form a government.

2a(ii). In 2a, Brown loses a vote in the House of Commons and resigns as Prime Minister and is replaced as leader of the Labour party. The leader of the next-biggest party (i.e. David Cameron) is then asked to form a government.

2b. Gordon Brown doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority and is replaced as Labour party leader and Prime Minister, his replacement then forming a single-party minority government with occasional outside support.

3a. Gordon Brown doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority but remains Labour party leader and Prime Minister and secures the support of other parties and forms a majority coalition government.

3a(i). See 2a(i) above.

3a(ii). See 2a(ii) above.

3b. Gordon Brown doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority, is replaced by another Labour party leader and Prime Minister who secures the support other parties and forms a majority coalition government.

4a. David Cameron doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority and forms a single-party minority government (with occasional support). Gordon Brown remains as leader of the Labour party.

4a(i). In 4a, Cameron loses a vote in the House of Commons and resigns as Prime Minister. Gordon Brown, as leader of the next-biggest party is then asked to form a government.

4b. David Cameron doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority and forms a single-party minority government (with occasional support). Gordon Brown is replaced as leader of the Labour party.

4b(i). In 4b, Cameron loses a vote in the House of Commons and resigns as Prime Minister. Gordon Brown’s replacement, as leader of the next-biggest party is then asked to form a government.

5a. David Cameron doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority but secures the support of other parties and forms a majority coalition government. Gordon Brown remains as leader of the Labour party.

5a(i). See 4a(i) above.

5b. David Cameron doesn’t secure an overall parliamentary majority but secures the support of other parties and forms a majority coalition government. Gordon Brown is replaced as leader of the Labour party.

5b(i). See 4b(i) above.

6a. David Cameron secures an overall parliamentary majority. Gordon Brown remains as leader of the Labour party.

6b. David Cameron secures an overall parliamentary majority. Gordon Brown is replaced as leader of the Labour party.

Phew. In terms of likelihood, my prediction is scenario 6b: that the Conservatives will be the largest party with a majority of between 20-40 and Labour dumping Gordon Brown. A David Cameron victory will mainly be fueled by a relatively low turnout because of voters further disenfranchised by the expenses scandals – a low turnout favours the Tories.

There. I’m glad I’ve cleared that up. If you’ve made it this far, you may be interested in my post on a hung parliament.

On a hung parliament in the UK

There has been plenty of talk of a hung parliament at the general election next year (see, for example, Steve Richards, Daniel Finkelstein and the flip-flopping Michael White).

Two excellent papers from within parliament itself shed light on this fascinating topic. The first is from the Hansard Society, called The impact of a hung parliament on British politics, which is a summary of the findings of its recent publication, No Overall Control?. The second is Standard Note SN/PC/04961 on Hung Parliaments from the House of Commons library (found here), which includes fascinating information on hung parliaments in the twentieth century as well as the wider constitutional issues arising from hung parliaments.

The papers throw up some very interesting points, which are summarised below.

First is that majority governments are not as common as we might think, despite our FPTP voting system exaggerating voting patterns. In the last 100 years, some 34 years have involved coalition or minority rule. If anything, the multiple-term governments of the Tories throughout the 80s and 90s and Labour in the 90s and 2000s have un-reminded us of this fact.

The second is that hung parliaments will result in one of four things: a single-party minority government with occasional outside support; a single-party minority government; a majority coalition (between two or more parties to share power – this differs from governments of ‘National Unity’ or where two parties come together to ultimately become one party); the dissolution of parliament. In the UK, single-party minority government has been the general result.

The third is what happens to the Prime Minister. In the twentieth century, no leader of the second largest party of a hung parliament became Prime Minister. Generally, the incumbent Prime Minister has 3 options: immediately resign; resign after defeat on a vote in the House of Commons; or resign only if they cannot secure support from any of the other parties. Whatever happens, in the event of a hung parliament, the existing Prime Minister remains the Prime Minster. The Queen must eventually appoint the person who is in the best position to receive the support of the majority of the Commons, exercising her prerogative.

This gives rise to the fourth point: the role of the Queen in the event of hung parliaments: the ‘definitive’ view is that of renowned constituionalist Vernon Bogdanor, who asserts that, since a government depends on the confidence of Parliament (as a parliamentary government) then a political solution between the leaders (perhaps facilitated by the Queen) would be the route to determine the way forward. This solves the issue of who forms a government. The other issue over which the Queen exercises a prerogative is dissolving Parliament and causing a general election, which is more straightforward. The Queen can refuse to dissolve Parliament if it is obvious there is an alternative government that can command the confidence of the House without seeking a further election. Otherwise, parliament is dissolved. In the twentieth century, the Queen has never refused to dissolve parliament.

The fifth is Canada: a FPTP parliamentary system, it regularly results in hung parliaments. However, the resulting minority government tends to work with smaller parties on a case-by-case basis, and that the experience in Canada of minority governments is far from poor, often requiring more negotiation and moderation/pragmatism.

The sixth is that a hung parliament makes it more likely that the Speaker’s casting vote will be required. If the Speaker is returned (as is traditional, they normally fight an uncontested election) then the Speaker is normally re-elected in a hung parliament. The Speaker then has 3 traditional options as to how they will exercise their casting vote: to call for further debate; to cast the deciding vote; or, in the case of a vote on an amendment to a bill, state that the bill will stay in its original form. (However, we know that there will be a challenge to John Bercow at the next election, which could put the cat amongst the other cats already amongst the pigeons.)

Seventh, some two-thirds of current MPs were elected in 1997 or later; thus, they have no experience of government without a strong majority. This issue is going to be exacerbated by the high turnover of MPs retiring as a result of the expenses scandals. How will they know how to behave in the event of a hung parliament if they don’t really know how to behave in a majority parliament?

Eighth, everyone recognises the importance of the Liberal Democrats in a hung parliament. It’s thus worth noting that, though they appear to be progressive, Philip Cowley notes they are currently three times more likely to vote with the Tories than with Labour.

Ninth is that a coalition government that arises from a hung parliament, representing more than half the voting public, could do a great deal to improve the relationship between politics and the public.

Finally, hung parliaments, in the UK at least, tend to be quite short-lived.

Hung parliaments are fascinating, and we shall see whether or not one will come to pass following the general election next year. Whatever happens, it seems that the only people who enjoy hung parliaments, or the prospect of them, are political geeks (which I suppose explains the length of this post).